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The Puzzle of Alfarabi’s Parallel Works
Miriam Galston
Abstract: Scholars disagree about the correct interpretation of Alfarabi’s Political
Regime and Virtuous City, treatises that have striking similarities, yet notable
differences. For some, the treatises encapsulate Alfarabi’s philosophy; for others,
they express only politically salutary opinions. Both interpretations fail to explain
why he wrote parallel works. If both reﬂect Alfarabi’s genuine philosophic
doctrines, why did he compose separate but parallel treatises, both written when
his philosophy was mature? Alternatively, if the treatises are political or rhetorical,
why did Alfarabi compose two versions, and why did he choose these two accounts
rather than others? To answer these questions, I discuss several overarching
differences between the treatises, concluding that each work has an inner coherence
and develops a distinctive narrative. I offer suggestions to account for the works’
distinctive orientations, both to persuade doubtful readers of their philosophic
signiﬁcance and to suggest to both groups of scholars reasons for their systematic
differences.

It is now widely recognized that medieval Islamic philosophy is Western philosophy in many, perhaps most, respects. Among other things, a large part of
the writings of the preeminent medieval philosophers who wrote in Arabic
consists in commentaries on the books of Plato, Aristotle, and their Greek
and Neoplatonist successors, whose works were translated into Arabic
starting in the eighth century AD. For example, Alfarabi, who is the subject
of this study, wrote commentaries (sometimes in multiple versions) on all
of Aristotle’s logical writings, and he commented on Aristotle’s Ethics,
Rhetoric, Poetics, and Metaphysics as well as Plato’s Laws. Like others in the
Islamic philosophical tradition, Alfarabi also wrote independent treatises,
that is, treatises on a variety of subjects that were not explicitly cast as reworkings of his Greek and Neoplatonist predecessors.
Alfarabi was the ﬁrst philosopher writing in Arabic to write systematically
in the area of political philosophy. His political works refer in varying degrees
to traditional religious subjects, such as prophecy, prophets, revelation, the
soul, and the next life. What is striking is the extent to which Alfarabi’s treatment of these themes actually focuses on secular questions raised by Greek
philosophers concerned about the relationship between philosophy and
Miriam Galston is Associate Professor of Law, The George Washington University,
Law School, 2000 H St., N.W., Washington, DC 20052 (mgalston@law.gwu.edu).
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politics. For example, his discussions of revelation and prophecy clearly
reﬂect Greek debates about such things as the origin of knowledge about
human things, whether theoretical knowledge is necessary to ground political
wisdom, and the role of moral virtue in enabling a political ruler to seek the
good for his community. Even his discussions of the scope and character of
political philosophy and political science reveal Alfarabi’s conclusion that
sharī‘ah had not superseded these disciplines or undermined their usefulness
for understanding political life, including, it seems, the nature and role of
sharī‘ah itself.
In short, one can say that Alfarabi understands Islamic political philosophy
as a subdivision of political philosophy more generally. As a consequence, nonspecialists who read Alfarabi will not only come to appreciate the degree to
which he portrays the encounter between philosophy and revealed religion
as mirroring the encounter between philosophy and political life in general.
His political writings may also deepen their understanding of the tensions
between the commitment to a philosophical life and engagement in politics, including the opportunities as well as the dilemmas these tensions occasion.
The present study examines two treatises that form part of Alfarabi’s political
writings: the Political Regime (PR) and the Virtuous City (VC).1 It discusses
problems of interpretation that arise because the content and structure of
the two works are largely congruent, yet the works diverge, sometimes
dramatically, in signiﬁcant areas. I call this the “puzzle” of Alfarabi’s parallel
works. Although they do not approach it through the lens of a puzzle, scholars disagree about Alfarabi’s purpose in writing the two works. For some, the
two treatises are intended to encapsulate Alfarabi’s mature theoretical and
political philosophy. For Richard Walzer, for example, VC is Alfarabi’s “last
and most mature Summa Philosophiae.”2 Other scholars, such as Deborah
Black, Thérèse-Anne Druart, Majid Fakhry, Charles Genequand, and Damien
Janos have similarly concluded that one or both treatises represent the
mature philosophy of Alfarabi.3

1

For bibliographic information, see notes 2 and 7–9 below.
Abu Naṣ r al-Fārābī, On the Perfect State (Mabādi’ Ārā’ Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍ ila), ed.
Richard Walzer (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), 1 (hereafter “Walzer, The Perfect State”
for Walzer’s comments and VC for Alfarabi’s text).
3
Deborah L. Black, “Al-Fārābī,” in History of Islamic Philosophy, ed. Seyyed Hossein
Nasr and Oliver Leaman (London: Routledge, 1996), 178, 188–90; Thérèse-Anne
Druart, “Al-Farabi and Emanationism,” in Studies in Medieval Philosophy, ed. John F.
Wippel (Washington, DC: Catholic University Press, 1987), 22, 28, 38–42; Majid
Fakhry, A Short History of Islamic Philosophy, Theology, and Mysticism (Oxford:
Oneworld, 1997), 40; Charles Genequand, “Metaphysics,” in History of Islamic
Philosophy, ed. Nasr and Leaman, 783, 788–89; Damien Janos, Method, Structure, and
Development in al-Fārābī’s Cosmology (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 39–42, 179, 326ff. (hereafter
al-Fārābī’s Cosmology).
2
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A contrasting view has been developed by Leo Strauss and his students.
Strauss asserted that views expressed in the cosmologies and sections on
natural philosophy in the two works are actually “l’ensemble des ‘opinions
des gens de la cité parfaite’” and, therefore, their content is dictated by the
needs of political life.4 Similarly, Muhsin Mahdi characterized the teachings
of the treatises as “rhetorical” and “popular” and, thus, as “not embody
[ing] either Alfarabi’s theoretical philosophy or his practical philosophy.”5
For these commentators, the treatises present models of the types of opinions
about the world that a wise founder of a religion or political regime should
communicate to the public to support the community and laws he establishes.
The positions of both groups of scholars fail to address the puzzle raised by
the existence of contrasting versions of a seemingly uniﬁed project. As was
noted by Amor Cherni, who edited and translated both works, the similarities
and differences the two works exhibit create a need for exploring the relation
between them.6 Dating the two treatises could facilitate this exploration;
however, both books were apparently written in the last decade of
Alfarabi’s life,7 when his thought is unlikely to have changed signiﬁcantly.
Further, even if the dates of the treatises were established with certainty, it
would still be necessary to determine whether different teachings in the
later work were intended to supplant or, instead, merely to supplement the
earlier work. This, in turn, presupposes understanding the conceptual relationship between the two treatises.

Leo Strauss, “Quelques remarques sur la science politique de Maïmonide et de
Fârâbî,” Revue des Études Juives 100 (1936): 1, 5, 30–31.
5
Muhsin S. Mahdi, Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2001), 3, 7, see 59, 123–24, 157 (hereafter Foundation). See
Charles E. Butterworth, “Al-Fārābī’s Introductory Sections to the Virtuous City,” in
Adaptations and Innovations: Studies in the Interaction between Jewish and Islamic
Thought and Literature from the Early Middle Ages to the Late Twentieth Century,
Dedicated to Professor Joel L. Kraemer, ed. Y. Tzvi Langermann and Josef Stern (Paris:
Peeters, 2007), 27, 30 (hereafter “Introductory Sections”) (much of what appears to
be philosophic in the treatises “in no way represent[s] how al-Farabi actually views
the universe and its parts”); Joshua Parens, Metaphysics as Rhetoric: Alfarabi’s
Summary of Plato’s “Laws” (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 20.
See also Christopher A. Colmo, Breaking with Athens: Alfarabi as Founder (Lanham,
MD: Lexington Books, 2005), 98–99; cf. 120–30.
6
Abû Nasr al-Fârâbî, La politique civile ou les principes des existants, ed. and trans.
Amor Cherni (Paris: Dar Albouraq, 2011), 15–16. See also Miriam Galston, Politics
and Excellence: The Political Philosophy of Alfarabi (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1990), chap. 5; Philippe Vallat, Farabi et l’école d’Alexandrie (Paris: J. Vrin, 2004).
7
Al-Fārābī, The Political Regime (Al-Siyāsa al-Madaniyya, also known as the Treatise on
the Principles of Beings), ed. Fauzi M. Najjar (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1964),
16–17 (Arabic). For Alfarabi’s life, see Dmitri Gutas, “Fārābī. I. Biography,”
Encyclopaedia Iranica 9 (1999): 208–13; Janos, al-Fārābī’s Cosmology, 12–16.
4
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The present study begins this inquiry by identifying several overarching
differences between the works that, taken together, suggest that each work
has an inner coherence and develops a distinctive narrative. Based upon
the patterns identiﬁed, I offer suggestions for characterizing the orientation
of each work. I hope, ﬁrst, to persuade those who characterize the treatises
as merely popular that they do reﬂect Alfarabi’s philosophic views in important ways and, second, to prompt those who equate the two treatises with
Alfarabi’s mature philosophy to recognize the need to address the systematic
differences the two works exhibit.

I. Part of Natural Philosophy Is More Autonomous in the Political
Regime than in the Virtuous City
The treatises are known today in English as the Political Regime8 and the
Virtuous City, 9 although both English translations have generated some controversy.10 Both works can be roughly divided into two halves: the ﬁrst
describe subjects addressed by metaphysics or cosmology and natural philosophy,11 while the second halves treat overtly political themes.

8

Citations are to Najjar’s edition followed by citations to the English translation of
Charles E. Butterworth in Alfarabi, The Political Writings, vol. 2, Political Regime and
Summary of Plato’s “Laws” (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015). An English
translation of the ﬁrst half by Jon McGinnis and David C. Reisman is in Classical
Arabic Philosophy: An Anthology of Sources, ed. McGinnis and Reisman (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 2007), 223–38 (hereafter Anthology). For English translations of the second
half, see Fauzi M. Najjar, in Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook, ed. Ralph
Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963), 32–56 (hereafter Sourcebook); Charles E. Butterworth, in Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook,
ed. Joshua Parens and Joseph C. Macfarland (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2011), 37–55 (hereafter Sourcebook2). English translations are my own unless otherwise
noted.
9
Citations are to Walzer’s edition, above note 2, followed by that of F. Dieterici
(Leiden: Brill, 1895/1964).
10
See Dmitri Gutas, “The Meaning of Madanī in al-Fārābī’s ‘Political Philosophy,’”
Mélanges de l’Université Saint-Joseph [hereafter MUSJ] 57 (2004): 259, 260–69, and
Amor Cherni, La politique civile, 11–13 (both reject translating madanī as “political”).
Compare Charles Genequand, “Loi morale, loi politique: al-Fārābī et Ibn Bağğa,”
MUSJ 61 (2008): 491, 499–503. I use “Political Regime” because it is used widely and
in Najjar’s edition. See also Gutas, review of Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic
Political Philosophy, by Muhsin S. Mahdi, International Journal of Middle East Studies 35
(2003): 146 (rejecting “Virtuous City” because the full Arabic title focuses on the principles of the citizens’ opinions).
11
The systematic treatment of politics in PR begins midway through the work (PR
69:16). VC is not divisible into “halves” so neatly, since some topics covered by PR
in the political half occur in the portion of VC prior to the explicitly political part.
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The ﬁrst halves depict the universe as a series of concentric spheres containing cosmic intelligences and heavenly bodies that ultimately derive from a
ﬁrst cause.12 The cosmologies in the treatises are very similar in many respects
and identical in some. Thus, at ﬁrst glance, the parallel cosmologies appear to
convey roughly the same narrative about the origin and structure of the universe. Nonetheless, the two accounts contain certain discrepancies that, in aggregate, indicate that part of natural science plays a more prominent and
autonomous role in PR than in VC. This difference, in turn, has implications
for the works’ respective discussions of political life.
First, VC opens with a lengthy elaboration of the “ﬁrst being,” which is the
ﬁrst cause of the existence of all other beings.13 In contrast, the ﬁrst sentence of
PR refers to “the principles by which bodies and their accidents are constituted.”14 Elsewhere Alfarabi deﬁnes natural science as the science that
gives an account of “the principles of the natural bodies and the principles
of their accidents.”15 The ﬁrst sentence of PR thus evokes the perspective of
natural science, rather than metaphysics, as does the beginning of VC.
Second, the ﬁrst half of VC follows an emanationist16 organization that
depicts the universe as descending from the ﬁrst being, through the heavenly
intellects and planets, and ending with the moon (VC 112:13–114:4/22:6–12).
The last intellect in the chain, later identiﬁed as the agent intellect, is thus
ten levels removed from the ﬁrst cause.17 In contrast, the ﬁrst page of PR
states that the ﬁrst cause is the proximate cause of the existence of the heavenly
intellects and also of the existence of the agent intellect (PR 31:12–13/29:19–21).
PR departs, then, from the linear emanationist structure of VC by making
the agent intellect independent of the other heavenly intellects (called “the
seconds”).18 Because the agent intellect is also associated with the sublunar
12

For the details, see Janos, al-Fārābī’s Cosmology, chap. 2.
See VC 56:2–100:9/5:4–18:3.
14
See PR 31:2–3/29:4–5.
15
Iḥ ṣ ā’ al-ʽulūm, ed. Osman Amine, 3rd ed. (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-‘Arabi, 1968),
116:12–13 (hereafter Enumeration); see 11:4–6. English translation by Charles E.
Butterworth is in Alfarabi, The Political Writings, vol. 1, Selected Aphorisms and Other
Texts (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 71–84 (hereafter Political Writings I).
16
On this term, see Lloyd P. Gerson, “Plotinus’s Metaphysics: Emanation or
Creation?,” Review of Metaphysics 46 (1993): 559–74.
17
See VC 104:3–11/19:22–20:4, 114:1–2/22:9–10. The agent intellect is not mentioned
by name until the end of the ﬁrst half of VC (202:7–9/45:9–10).
18
The suggestion of independence is reinforced when PR refers repeatedly to “the
second [intellects] and the agent intellect” (emphasis added) in places for which the
counterpart passages in VC refer to “the second [intellects]” in aggregate, without
distinguishing the agent intellect. Compare PR 49:1–52:5/44:1–46:13 with VC
100:11–104:11/19:1–20:4. See also PR 31:4/29:7–8 (assigning the second intellects to
the second rank and the agent intellect to the third rank), 31:7–8/29:11–13, 34:16/
32:21–22, 40:1/37:3; VC 104:6–11/19:23–20:5; Janos, al-Fārābī’s Cosmology, 143–44,
174–76.
13
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sphere in both treatises, the effect of attributing its existence directly to the
ﬁrst cause in PR is to suggest a degree of autonomy for the part of the
natural world associated with the agent intellect. To that extent, natural
science would be independent of cosmology.19
Third, after the paragraph stating the direct causal relation between the ﬁrst
cause and the agent intellect, PR contains several pages outlining the different
types of soul, focused primarily on the agent intellect’s functions, including its
role enabling people to actualize their potential as rational beings (see PR
32:6–34:15/30:2–32:20). This creates another contrast: the movement in VC is
from the supralunar cosmos to the sublunar world, whereas PR begins
discussing an important part of the sublunar or natural world and only afterward elaborates the ﬁrst cause, heavens, and sublunar world in the traditional
order.20 Part of natural science, namely, philosophical psychology,21 thus
seems independent of part of metaphysics or the study of the heavens.
In sum, because of the differences in the structure and topics of the initial
sections of the two treatises, PR appears to portray part of the natural
world and natural science, namely, human rationality and philosophical psychology, as more autonomous than they appear in VC.

II. The Life of the Mind as a Way of Life Is Pivotal to the Political
Regime, but Not to the Virtuous City
In both treatises, human perfection is portrayed in terms of a human being (or
his intellect) transcending, i.e., not needing, his (or its) material attributes to
“subsist” or “be constituted” ( fī qiwāmih).22 Transcendence does not require
the literal death of the body: in both treatises, the ﬁrst ruler who has attained
revelation achieves transcendence, yet subsequently engages in a variety of
helpful political activities while still very much alive.23 Transcendence may
19
Of course, the sublunar world remains inﬂuenced by the supralunar world in
other ways.
20
Contrast Druart, “Al-Farabi and Emanationism,” 38–42, who characterizes PR
31–42/29–39 as “a brief study of each of the principles he has just listed,” and PR
42–69/39–60 as “an account of how all beings derive from the ﬁrst cause.”
21
For the view that the study of the soul belongs to natural science, at least insofar as
it is connected with body, see Aristotle, On the Soul 403a27–28; Black, “Al-Fārābī,” 189.
22
Qiwām may refer to a thing’s physical existence or survival. See VC 228:2–3/53:8–9.
Elsewhere it refers to something fundamental, like a thing’s core or self. See Alfarabi,
Al-Fārābī’s Philosophy of Aristotle (Falsafat Arisṭ ūṭ ālīs), ed. Muhsin Mahdi (Beirut: Dār
Majallat Shiʽr, 1961), 89:16–17 (in his exploration of natural beings, Aristotle connects
each being’s “what-ness,” “substance,” qiwām, and “nature”). See also Alfarabi,
Eisagoge (Kitāb Isāghūjī Ay al-Madkhal), in Al-Manṭ iq ʻinda al-Fārābī, ed. Rafīq
al-ʻAjam, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dar al-Mashriq, 1985), 87:3; English in Anthology, 55.
23
See, e.g., PR 79:3–17/68:28–69:2, 83:12–13/72:31–34; VC 242:15–246:7/58:13–59:13.
See also Muhsin Mahdi, Abū Naṣ r Al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-Milla wa Nuṣ ūṣ Ukhrā/Alfarabi’s
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occur when a human engages in the spiritual or intellectual activity that is essential to his identity24 without requiring material support or bodily involvement for its exercise. Examples might be attaining a level or type of cognitive
inquiry in which the mind ceases to rely on sense data25 or contemplating
objects or activities that themselves have no material existence, for example,
thinking about the nature of the soul, the mind, or thought itself. Perhaps
transcendence refers to thinking about things that do have a material existence, but at a level of abstraction or generality such as occurs in parts of
logic, mathematics, physics, or metaphysics. Transcendence could then
refer to reﬂection on the nature of causation, relation, magnitude, etc.,
without reference to the attributes of any particular object of which these
notions can be predicated.
1. Three models of the role of the agent intellect in developing reason. Whatever
the precise content of the activity of the soul that attains transcendence,
both treatises portray the agent intellect as partly responsible for a person’s
ability to achieve it. Several places in PR suggest that the agent intellect actively
and directly makes certain things happen to human beings or to the rational
faculty by using the Arabic causative form to describe its actions. For
example, the agent intellect seeks to “cause [the rational animal] to obtain
[tablīgh]” the highest levels of perfection (PR 32:6–7/30:3–4) and “it causes [the
rational faculty] to become [yuṣ ayyiru]” actual intellect (PR 35:6/38:1–2).
Elsewhere in PR, Alfarabi explains the action of the agent intellect by employing the light image used by Aristotle in On the Soul.26 In these passages,
the agent intellect is said to supply the human mind with something akin to
light in the domain of sense perception, which enables sight to perceive the
material world (PR 35:12–17/33:12–21). Hence, a person “becomes” actual intellect “through this” (bihi yaṣ īru) (PR 36:1–2/33:24–25), with the agent intellect a catalyst or indirect cause of the transformation of potential intellect
into actual intellect.
A third approach to the relation between the agent intellect and the human
mind is captured in a passage that describes the agent intellect as providing
humans perfection beyond bodily perfection by giving man “a faculty
[quwwah] and a principle [mabda‘] with which he strives, or with which he

Book of Religion and Related Texts (Beirut: Dar al-Mashriq, 1968), 45:7–9 (hereafter
Religion) (connecting misery, but not happiness, with the next life). An English translation is in Butterworth, Political Writings I, 93–113. Butterworth has “the next life”
modify both happiness and death (ibid., 95).
24
See PR 35:4–5/32:37–38 (the rational faculty is what a makes a human being a
human being).
25
See Alfarabi, Fuṣ ūl Muntazaʻah (Selected Aphorisms), ed. Fauzi M. Najjar (Beirut:
Dar el-Mashriq, 1971), No. 81, 86:10–87:7; English in Butterworth, Political Writings I,
11–67.
26
Aristotle, On the Soul 3.5 430a14–17.
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has the capacity to strive, on his own for the remaining perfections”
(PR 71:14–16/62:19–22).27 This suggests that transcendence requires a
greater degree of initiative on a person’s part than is evoked by the ﬁrst
two approaches because the agent intellect imparts only a faculty and a principle, because these are said to enable a human being to strive or “to have the
capacity” to strive, and because Alfarabi adds the qualiﬁcation “on his own”
(PR 71:15–16/62:22). In the same vein, Alfarabi observes that once people
obtain the primary cognitions afforded by the agent intellect, they are
capable of choice and thus the ability to strive “or not to strive” for happiness
(PR 72:9–14/63:3–11). Perfection and happiness are thus doubly contingent
because they depend in part on the agent intellect and in part on human striving, but the agent intellect can only make possible, not assure, the existence of
striving.28
The counterpart passages in VC contain many elements of the ﬁrst two
models of the agent intellect’s function present in PR.29 The treatises differ,
however, as regards the third model. Although VC contains the doctrine that
transcendence cannot occur without certain acts of the human will
(VC 204:15–206:4/46:10–11), it also states that contemplation and other forms
of reasoning arise “naturally” once primary intelligibles emerge in the
human mind (VC 204:6–8/45:22–23). Further, it fails to mention the possibility
that people will not choose to use the intelligibles to engage in the pursuit of
further knowledge or that the pursuit will entail striving. It also lacks a discussion like the one in PR regarding the wide variation in people’s capacities for
grasping primary intelligibles beyond those apprehended by almost all
people (PR 75:5–17/65:17–37). In fact, according to VC, the emergence of
primary intelligibles will naturally trigger a desire for further discovery
(VC 204:6–7/45:22–23). One consequence of these features of VC is that the development of human reason appears less problematic than it does in PR. By the
same token, the emphasis on individual initiative in PR suggests that cognitive
development depends upon a person’s voluntary efforts over time. This, in
turn, implies a commitment or way of life devoted in signiﬁcant part to
taking advantage of the initial endowment associated with the agent intellect.
2. Education and instruction. In PR, Alfarabi says that most people have
sound innate human dispositions and grasp intelligbles “common to all”;
this enables them to strive after matters and activities they have in common
(PR 75:4–5/65:14–16). Beyond these common things, people are said to
possess varying abilities for grasping intelligibles. Some can grasp intelligibles only in certain subjects; some are limited in the number of intelligibles
27

Philippe Vallat, al-Fārābī: Le livre du régime politique (Paris: Belles Lettres, 2012),
132–33, equates the faculty with the principle.
28
People’s capacity for perfection also depends upon their natural endowments,
which are traceable, in part, to their material circumstances; these, in turn, reﬂect
the positions and motions of the heavenly bodies. See PR 70:8–71:13/61:11–62:16.
29
See VC 198:4–15/44:1–9, 200:1–202:16/44:11–45:15.
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they can grasp within a subject; and they have varying abilities to use intelligibles to derive further discoveries (istinbāṭ ) (PR 75:5–17/65:17–37). Finally,
this passage notes that two people who are equally adept in all of the
above respects may nonetheless differ in their capacity to teach (taʻlīm)
and guide (irshād) others about what they have themselves discovered
(PR 75:17–76:1/65:37–66:3). There is no parallel in VC for the types of comparisons between people described in this paragraph.
This extended passage in PR thus introduces the theme of the importance of
education and training for developing human reason. In the following pages,
Alfarabi cautions that naturally having an innate disposition for something
only makes it easier to do what one is naturally disposed to do and to be motivated to do if no external force exerts pressure in the opposite direction
(PR 76:3–6/66:5–10). As a consequence, he says that, to reach their ﬁnal perfections, all people, regardless of the innate dispositions they possesses naturally,
need to be trained and educated in the things toward which they are disposed
(PR 76:11–13/66:17–20). Otherwise even people with very superior innate dispositions may lose the beneﬁt of their original endowments (PR 76:13–14/
66:20–23), and people with lesser natures who are educated in a particular
ﬁeld can actually surpass in accomplishments those with superior natures
that lack such education (PR 77:12–14/67:16–19).
The narrative of PR thus shifts from the contributions to the human project
made by the heavenly bodies and the agent intellect to the contributions required
by individuals and to the danger of squandering people’s natural aptitudes, if
proper nurturing does not take place.30 One theme of the passage summarized
is thus the importance of the transmission of learning, or the tools that make
learning possible, within a community and from generation to generation.
These themes are also not repeated in VC. That treatise does state that
people possess varying abilities in “the arts and the like” (VC 238:14–240:1/
57:6–9, see 266:6–268:2/65:15–66:5), but does not elaborate people’s differences
respecting the sciences, intelligibles, reasoning from intelligibles, and guiding
or teaching others.31 VC also states that people have varied innate endowments
(ﬁṭ ar), but it does so only in the context of their participation as citizens of a city
(VC 232:5–234:5/54:19–55:11). Thus, ruling and being ruled are presented in political terms in VC, whereas PR depicts hierarchies of ruling and serving in both
political and cognitive terms. This contrast is consistent with one treatise depicting the agent intellect as a catalyst for human effort and the other stating
that reasoning arises naturally when certain conditions exist. Thus, the emphasis on education and instruction in PR supports the identiﬁcation of human
perfection with a rational life understood as an ongoing endeavor.

30
Alfarabi uses forms of three terms in the passage summarized: ta’addub, irshād, and
ta‘līm. Although in general ta’addub can mean breeding or moral education, in this
context, it seems that Alfarabi has in mind rational development.
31
VC does, of course, speak to these qualities in a founder or ruler.
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3. Contrasting treatments of man’s bodily existence. The above differences
between the two works appear connected to a striking difference in the attention they pay to man’s bodily functions. VC contains lengthy and detailed discussions of the parts of the body (e.g., limbs, nerves, organs) and the
intricacies of human reproduction (VC 174:10–196:3/37:12–43:8). PR does
not even allude to these topics.
Relatedly, when VC outlines the ﬁve faculties of the human soul (VC 164:2–
15/34:13–35:1), it elaborates in detail how the nutritive faculty works with
various organs (VC 166:1–12/35:1–10). In contrast, nutrition is not mentioned
in PR, even when Alfarabi enumerates the faculties of the human soul
(PR 32:14–33:15/30:17–31:21, see 73:10–11/63:35–37).32 Consequently, the
human soul has only four faculties in PR, whereas in VC, it has ﬁve.33 VC implicitly explains PR’s omission when it states that the nutritive faculty exists
only to serve the body, whereas the remaining faculties exist to serve both
the body and reason (VC 206:16–208:1/46:21–47:1). PR thus ignores the
aspect of the soul that has no direct effect on the rational faculty.
In VC, the concept of “rule” (riyāsah) is introduced in the context of bodily
or material substances (VC 162:4/34:4–5) and then developed through descriptions of the workings of the faculty of nutrition, bodily organs, and
sense perception (VC 166:1ff./35:1ff., 196:7–8/43:10–12). In PR, in contrast,
“rule” is introduced in connection with the mind, speciﬁcally, in the
passage detailing the differing abilities that people have for discovery and
guiding others in cognitive pursuits (PR 77:7–17/67:8–28, see 78:8–16/68:10–22).
Since the concept of rule, or governance, is the organizing principle of large
parts of both works, the context in which Alfarabi ﬁrst chooses to emphasize
that hierarchies imply rulership is noteworthy. In VC, it is empirical observation
about the way competing limbs and organs work together in a harmonious
whole that triggers the idea of rank ordering and governance. In PR, the rank
ordering of cognitive capacities and accomplishments triggers the idea that
some individuals are ﬁt to rule over others in certain respects.
The contrasts discussed so far can be connected as follows. PR emphasizes
the centrality of reason in the world more than VC by attributing the existence
of the agent intellect directly to the ﬁrst cause; discussing the agent intellect,
the rational soul, and intellectual perfection in the opening pages of the book;
and minimizing its recognition of the material component of human life.34
32

They are the rational, appetitive, imaginative, and sense-perceptive faculties.
PR 73:10–11/63:35–37 says that there are ﬁve faculties of the human soul: the
theoretical rational, the practical rational, the appetitive, the imaginative, and the
sense-perceptive. Thus, in this passage there are ﬁve faculties because the rational is
subdivided into theoretical and practical faculties.
34
PR does, however, acknowledge the role of appetite in the genesis of volition
(PR 72:5–7/62:30–35) and implies that appetite determines whether someone who
grasps the nature of happiness through theoretical inquiry will make its pursuit his
life’s mission (see PR 73:13–18/64:4–12, 74:5–12/64:20–29).
33
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Correspondingly, VC takes the material dimension of humanity more seriously
than PR by detailing the nature of the heavenly bodies (the source of the material stratum of life on earth) prior to describing man’s rational potential, elaborating the operation of man’s bodily systems in great detail, and associating
rulership with the material and political strata of existence.35
Consistent with framing the contrasts this way is VC’s focus on how each
faculty comes into being (ḥ adatha).36 The account of the soul in PR, in contrast,
is presented as a classiﬁcation of the faculties based upon the function or character of each.37 The former account thus focuses on the “what” and the “from
what” of each faculty, whereas the latter views the soul in terms of the “what”
and the “for what.”38 The account of the soul in VC thus emphasizes the agent
and material causes, whereas PR highlights the formal and ﬁnal causes.39
Similarly, since the agent intellect’s function is portrayed as “seeking to
enable [or cause] the rational animal to reach its highest degree of perfection,
namely, ultimate happiness” (PR 32:6–7/30:3–4), and perfection is characterized
in several places in terms of a relation with the agent intellect (PR35:4–11/32:37–
33:11, 35:17–36:5/33:22–30, 71:10–13/52:13–16), PR introduces the notion of ends
as causes in the beginning of the treatise, with its initial description of the agent
intellect.
PR’s initial focus on ﬁnal causes does not on its own necessitate the thesis of
this section about rational development as a way of life, but it is suggestive
because the agent and material causes are oriented toward what happens
to humans viewed as recipients, whereas ﬁnal causes are oriented toward
the ends pursued (and not necessarily attained).40 In sum, stepping back
from the technical details of the two works, it is noteworthy that PR’s focus
on education and certain facets of cognitive development has no counterpart
in VC and that VC’s preoccupation with bodily functions has no counterpart
in PR. This difference is epitomized by the fact that the soul in PR has four
faculties, whereas in VC, it has ﬁve because nutrition is considered part of
the soul. Because cognition is elaborated in PR in terms of human striving
and because of the book’s orientation toward ends and ultimate ends, the
35

See also VC 178:9–16/38:15–19 (describing how bodily functions and states affect
the capacity for thinking).
36
VC 164:2–15/34:13–35:1. Similarly, the Summary of VC references the genesis of the
objects of discussion repeatedly in the ﬁrst half of the work. See VC 38–48/1–4.
37
Likewise PR initiates a discussion of several topics with a theoretical or conceptual
map that situates the subject to be discussed in a larger framework. See, e.g., PR 31:2–
11/29:4–17, 58:1–3/51:9–12, 69:5–17/60:1–22, 77:1–17/66:27–67:28.
38
See PR 36:15–16/34:11–13; Alfarabi, Taḥ ṣ īl al-Saʻādah, ed. Jaʻﬁr al-Yasin (Beirut:
Al-Andaloss, 1981), 52:10–17 (hereafter Happiness), translated in Sourcebook and
Sourcebook2.
39
See PR 42:13/39:9–10 (the rational part of the human soul is itself a cause in the
sense of an end and not in the sense of an agent).
40
See subsection 3 of the next section, below.
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development of reason in that work appears to entail commitment to cultivating and sustaining a way of life that minimizes the importance of bodily
needs to the greatest extent possible.

III. Politically Salutary Opinions Matter More to the Virtuous City
than to the Political Regime
PR was often transmitted with the subtitle The Principles of the Beings.41 The
full title of VC is The Principles of the Opinions of the Inhabitants of the
Virtuous City. To understand the contrast suggested between the principles
of the beings and the principles of the citizens’ opinions requires examining
Alfarabi’s understanding of the nature of opinion and the role opinions
play in a political community.
1. Opinions and imagery. According to both treatises, all citizens of virtuous
cities ought to know about the ultimate principles and ranks of the beings,
happiness, the ﬁrst rulership of a virtuous city, and the ranks of rule in that
city.42 Alfarabi sometimes calls such beliefs about fundamentals, combined
with practical precepts concerning how people should behave, the religion
(millah) or law (sharīʻah) of a community.43 Both treatises observe that these
topics can be known either by means of some kind of rational cognition or
through a person’s imagination (PR 85:3–4/74:8–10, see VC 278:8–10/69:19–21).
In the former case, the essential natures of the things can be known “as they
really are”; in the latter, a person “knows” imaginings, images, or imitations
of things, rather than things as they really are.44 According to PR, “most
people” can only know fundamentals through images, not as they really are
(PR 85:12–14/74:24–28, 86:28/75:3–13; see Religion 47:22). Most people should
therefore be taught these things using images (PR 85:12–14/74:24–28). Both
works recognize that, to be persuasive, images must be cast in terms familiar
to the intended audience and that what is familiar varies from group to
group or nation to nation (PR 86:4–5/75:6–9; VC 280:1–4/70:6–7). Thus, both
According to Najjar, Political Regime, 11–12 (Arabic), the ﬁrst mention in Arabic
sources of PR being known as The Principles of Being occurs in Ibn Abī Uṣ aibi‘ah,
ʻUyūn al–Anbā’ fī Ṭ abaqāt al–Aṭ ibbāʾ, ed. August Müller (Königsberg, 1884), 2:139. He
died three centuries after Alfarabi’s death. As Najjar notes, the Jewish philosopher
Moses Maimonides used that title almost a century earlier. See “Letter from
Maimonides to Samuel ibn Tibbon,” in Letters of Maimonides, ed. Isaac Shailat
(Jerusalem: Maliyot, 1988), 530, 553 (medieval Hebrew text of the letter).
42
See PR 84:17–18/74:1–4; cf. 85:3–4/74:8–10. The list has more detail and a different
emphasis in VC 276:10–278:5/69:6–17.
43
See Alfarabi, Religion 46:11–14; PR 85:18–86:2/75:1–3.
44
See PR 85:3–6/74:8–13; VC 278:8–11/69:19–70:1. In Religion (46:17–18), Alfarabi also
observes that the opinions of the “virtuous religion” can be the truth (al-ḥ aqq) or an
image of the truth (mithāl al-ḥ aqq).
41
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works envision multiple virtuous nations and cities, each with a religion employing distinctive imagery to describe what citizens should believe, even if
they pursue the same understanding of happiness (PR 85:17–86:1/74:34–75:3;
VC 280:4–6/70:6–10).
Alfarabi’s insistence on the necessity for rulers to ensure that citizens’ opinions are convincing and held in common derives from his view that people’s
opinions about the world, man’s place in it, and nature in general are likely to
inﬂuence their character, moral norms, and behavior.45 PR captures this
concern when it discusses potential images that a ruler could select along
three dimensions: ﬁrst, whether they are better or worse imaginative representations;46 second, their proximity or distance from the truth about the
world; and third, the quantity, visibility, and persuasive power of the
“points of contention” the images chosen elicit.47 The work cautions that, if
it is necessary to choose among these criteria, proximity to the truth is of
less importance than the quality of an imaginative representation and avoiding numerous or obvious points of contention (see PR 87:2–4/75:33–36).48 This
statement is surprising if one thinks that the assertion “religion is an imitation
of philosophy”49 implies that ﬁdelity to underlying philosophic truths should
be the dominant standard for evaluating religious imagery.
PR does not explain the reason for not ranking the truth content of imagery
as the highest criterion, leaving the impression that the purpose of citizens
having beliefs about fundamentals derives more from their political salience
than their intellectual content. VC develops this impression by elaborating at
length the potential damage if people recognize the problematic aspects of
doctrines portrayed through images (VC 280:7–14/70:11–18). For example,
some may assume that the beliefs taught contain no truth at all and, thus,
become skeptical about the possibility of truth simply; others may take advantage of questions provoked by imagery to repudiate the beliefs taught

45

See Religion 45:20–24; see also 43:3–44:6; Aphorisms, No. 61; VC 286–328/72–85
(how ignorant opinions inﬂuence conduct).
46
The text says, “Some are more judicious [aḥ kam] and complete [atamm] imaginings,
while others are more defective” (PR 86:11–12/75:18–19). Najjar translates aḥ kam
“better” (Sourcebook, 41); Butterworth translates “wiser” (Sourcebook2, 43). Arabic
ḥ *k*m can refer to wisdom or judgment.
47
PR 86:11–14/75:18–23; see VC 280:11–13/70:14–16. “Points of contention” is Najjar’s
translation (Sourcebook, 41). Walzer (281) translates “grounds for objection.”
48
Cf. Happiness 91:11.
49
As Joshua Parens notes, Alfarabi attributes this potentially heretical proposition to
“the Ancients” (Parens, An Islamic Philosophy of Virtuous Religions: Introducing Alfarabi
[Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006], 97; see Alfarabi, Happiness 90:14–
15). Alfarabi seems to elaborate the doctrine in his own name in Religion 46:22–47:16;
Alfarabi’s Book of Letters (Kitāb Al-Ḥ urūf): Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, ed.
Muhsin Mahdi (Beirut: Dar el-Mashriq, 2004), 131, ¶108.
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and justify indulging in a life devoted to “ignorant goods,” such as honor,
wealth, or physical pleasures, rather than real goods.50 In short, if religious
imagery is open to frequent objections that lead to such things as skepticism
or hedonism, it will be ineffective or even dangerous.
Further, according to VC, people who observe that the world appears to be
in constant ﬂux may conclude that nothing can be known with certainty and
permanence (VC 286:3–8/72:1–2). People who observe that many parts of
nature are antagonistic to each other may conclude that there is no order or
criterion of desert in nature (VC 286:9–290:4/72:2–73:1). They may then
reason that political life should mirror nature: cities should ﬁght and seek
to subdue other cities, and individuals should view one another as enemies
and only cooperate out of necessity (see VC 290:5–292:5/73:2–16). Such
people would then endorse the precept that “might makes right” and conclude that justice consists in dominating others through force and rewarding
the best warriors (see VC 292:6–296:12/73:17–74:23, 298:4–300:10/75:8–76:6).
VC cautions further that, to those who generalize these notions, laws for fair
dealing in commercial transactions, norms of good behavior, and even religious teachings linking certain types of conduct to reward and punishment
in the next life could all be seen as strategies adopted by weak people to compensate for their inability to obtain what they want through force.51
According to such people, “the good consists in ruling by force, to be attained
in two ways, by straight attack and by deceit: whoever is capable of straightforward attack will act accordingly and who is not, will succeed by cheating,
fraud and treachery, ruse, hypocrisy, deceit and leading people astray”
(VC 314:7–10/80:12–14, trans. Walzer).
In sum, that proximity to the truth is not the dominant criterion for evaluating imagery, as is stated in PR and implied in VC, is a consequence of the
social, ethical, and political impact that citizens’ beliefs about the world
may have on their behavior as individuals and as members of a community.
2. Citizen opinions and the city’s well-being. The preceding raises the following
conundrum. Citizens must hold certain beliefs about fundamentals, but most
people can only grasp them through images, not as they really are. What,
then, is the status of the doctrines advanced in the two treatises, which
include fundamentals such as the citizens should grasp?
The emanationist cosmologies in VC and PR depict a universe of order, permanence, essential natures, and causal relations; everything occupies a place
in one or more clearly delineated hierarchy. The entire universe unfolds, as it
were, from a single, simple, unifying causal principle.52 Thus, although
50

See VC 282:6–284:12/71:1–21. In some cases, imagery that triggers controversy can
have a beneﬁcial effect. See VC 280:15–282:5/70:18–71:1; PR 104:17–105:6/91:13–25.
51
See generally VC 300:11–308:7/76:7–78:14. This brief summary does not do justice
to the richness of the description in these passages.
52
See PR 57:1–3/50:16–19 (the ﬁrst cause is the cause of both necessary being, which
must exist, and possible being, which can exist or not); VC 94:7–8/17:2–3 (same).
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emanationist cosmologies may originate in theoretical insights, they also
describe the origin or structure of the universe in a manner consistent with
the practical needs of individuals and communities. People who accept the
cosmologies literally are unlikely to view the world as fundamentally arbitrary or chaotic. Theory and the demands of practical life thus appear to
coincide.
The sublunar world, in contrast, poses a greater challenge because it is characterized by contingency and contrariety. Both treatises seem to address the
threats this poses by emphasizing the permanence within nature and by
using political terminology to describe the natural world.53 For example,
PR states that it is the nature of possible beings to be capable of existing or
ceasing to exist, or to exist in a deﬁnite way although an opposing being
will also exist, because possible beings are made up of matter and form. It
is the nature of matter to be able to exist in contrary ways, and this is
matter’s due (ḥ aqq) and merit (istihāl), while it is in the nature of form to
exist as it is without ceasing to exist, and this is its due and merit.
Generation and corruption are then expressly portrayed as expressions of
“justice” in nature.54
The effect of framing the transformation and decay that natural bodies
undergo in terms of desert and justice is to impose a kind of orderliness
and ﬁttingness in what might otherwise appear to be random and unsettling.
These passages may be part of what impelled the commentators mentioned
earlier to believe that the two treatises are merely rhetorical and popular,
rather than philosophical. Alfarabi’s purpose in casting natural phenomena
in terms of justice and merit, in other words, could be signaling that apparently
theoretical portions of the treatises are really driven by the need to establish
salutary opinions for citizens rather than by his philosophic insights.
This is not the only plausible inference, however, even if Alfarabi did characterize the workings of nature as “just” for rhetorical reasons. As is argued
below, the presence of distinctive narratives in the two treatises tends to undermine the view that the works are devoid of philosophical content.
Moreover, PR contains numerous important teachings that do not seem salutary for the “multitude.” Finally, because the discrepancies between the two
works are consistent with the contrasts developed in sections I and II
above, there appear to be philosophic reasons for Alfarabi’s decision to
create parallel depictions of the universe and mankind’s place in it.

53

See Abû Nasr al-Fârâbî, Opinions des habitants de la cité vertueuse, ed. Amor Cherni
(Paris: Dar Albouraq, 2011), 124n2, 126n2.
54
This is a brief summary of PR 56:13–62:10/50:7–54:28. The counterpart passage in
VC (144:3–162:13/30:6–34:11) also emphasizes that the existence of contrariety and generation and corruption derive from the natures of matter and form, describes the
changes that occur as what they merit, and uses “justice” to describe the changes dictated by their natures.
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3. The Political Regime contains views likely to unsettle citizens. In several
areas, the content of PR seems potentially more controversial than the counterpart narrative of VC. Several aspects of the portrayal of the agent intellect
fall under this heading. First, according to PR, the agent intellect represents
providence (or concern, ʽināyah) with respect to human beings (PR 32:6),
but this is what it seeks (iltimās) (PR 32:6–9/30:2–5),55 not necessarily what
it achieves. In the second half of the work, Alfarabi underscores the limitations of providence by stating that the heavenly bodies are indifferent to
the agent intellect’s activities and, accordingly, at times operate in ways that
obstruct its purpose (PR 73:1–8/63:20–32).
It is difﬁcult to understand why Alfarabi would include this potentially disturbing picture of a world in which matter and motion can obstruct the force
for reason and human perfection, given PR’s concern about avoiding points of
contention in imagery used to teach people about the world.56 By the same
token, it is not surprising that the passage about the heavens and agent intellect working at cross purposes is not repeated in VC. VC also presents a less
problematic world by omitting PR’s depiction of the agent intellect as dependent upon human striving to fulﬁll its function.
A similar discrepancy exists in the treatises’ portrayals of the workings of
nature. Although both cast contingency and contrariety in terms of nature’s
“justice,” VC characterizes the degree of justice exhibited in nature far more
extravagantly: in VC, the citizens should know57 that everything that
happens to any of the possible beings reﬂects “precision, perfection, providence, justice, and wisdom” (VC 276:10–278:1/69:613). In PR, in contrast,
justice inheres in things’ natures rather than in every happening they
experience.
The contrast between the treatises can also be seen in their descriptions of
revelation. In both, revelation consists in an emanation to the human mind
attributable to the agent intellect and the ﬁrst cause.58 PR says that the emanation occurs from the agent intellect to the human mind and then adds that
“it may be possible to say that the ﬁrst cause is the source of revelation to this
human being through the mediation of the agent intellect because the
agent intellect emanates from the existence of the ﬁrst cause” (PR 80:1–3/
69:20–23). This sentence is startling because it appears to limit the agency of
On different meanings of ʽināyah see Alfarabi, Aphorisms, No. 87. See also Walzer,
The Perfect State, 473–74.
56
VC (142:8–13/29:20–23) also notes that heavenly bodies may assist or oppose the
sublunar beings. However, this general statement is not connected to the activity of
the agent intellect and does not draw out the implications for the possibility of
human perfection, as occurs in PR. The counterpart general statement is at PR
64:13–14/56:19–20.
57
Reading yaʻlamahā with Dieterici (69:6) and Cherni (281:4), rather than yaʻmalahā
with Walzer (276:10).
58
See PR 79:12–80:3/69:9–23; VC 244:1–16/58:15–59:4.
55
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the ﬁrst cause in revelation to the mere fact that its existence is the source of
the agent intellect’s existence, instead of portraying the ﬁrst cause as actively
involved in the process and content of revelation.
According to VC, revelation occurs when the agent intellect acts on both the
theoretical and practical parts of a human being’s rational faculty as well as
his imaginative faculty (VC 244:7–9/58:18–20). Alfarabi then adds that
“Allah, powerful and sublime, reveals to him through the mediation of the
agent intellect, so that what emanates from Allah, blessed and exalted, to
the agent intellect is what emanates from the agent intellect” to the person’s
intellect and imagination (VC 244:9–12/58:20–22).59 The deity is thus identiﬁed as the source of the content of revelation, whereas the agent intellect
serves merely as an intermediary.60
These differences in the description of revelation are consistent with the
suggestion that PR accords the agent intellect and philosophical psychology
a degree of autonomy that is lacking in VC. In the same vein, PR asserts
that revelation, i.e., the union of the human and agent intellects, is explained
in On the Soul (PR 79:9–11/69:4–8),61 reinforcing the impression that revelation
can be understood completely without recourse to theology or religion. This
impression is also consistent with Alfarabi’s statement elsewhere that how
revelation occurs became clear in theoretical science.62
PR contains additional teachings that could well be controversial to ordinary citizens. Both treatises include “the ﬁrst rulership” among the fundamentals that the inhabitants of the virtuous city should know about
(PR 84:17–18/74:1–3; see VC 278:3/69:15). For both, the ﬁrst ruler is a person
who has achieved theoretical and practical rational perfection and who can
ﬁgure out and prescribe for others the means to attain happiness.63 Both
works ascribe revelation to the ﬁrst ruler (PR 79:12–80:3/69:9–24; VC 244:3–
13/58:15–23).64 And both contemplate the possibility of multiple “ﬁrst”

59
The quotation ends “to his passive intellect through the mediation of the acquired
intellect; then to his faculty of imagination” (VC 244:12–13/58:22–23). See Herbert A.
Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of
the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992), 9–12. The role of imagination in revelation in VC has been discussed extensively.
See Fazlur Rahman, Prophecy in Islam: Philosophy and Orthodoxy (London: George Allen
& Unwin, 1958), 30–91.
60
Noteworthy, of course, is that VC references “Allah.” However, the contrast is not
between a natural as against a theological account of revelation. Despite the religious
terminology, the portrayal of revelation in VC depicts natural processes, i.e., the interaction between the rational and imaginative faculties of the human soul.
61
Both Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias wrote a book with this title. See
Cherni, La politique civile, 160n395.
62
Religion 44:12–13.
63
See PR 79:3–80:5/68:28–69:27; VC 240:1–248:14/57:9–60:11.
64
See also Religion 44:6–13.
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rulers, i.e., a series of individuals all of whom attain the level of perfection attained by the initial ﬁrst ruler explicitly depicted as receiving revelation
(PR 80:14–15/70:10–14; VC 248:15–250:6/60:11–15).
Only PR, however, contains the following observation:
Just as it is permissible for each of them to change a Law that he had legislated at one time… for another if he deems it better to do so [at another
time], similarly it is permissible for the living who succeeds the one who
died to change what the latter had legislated, for the one who died also
would have changed it had he been able to observe the new conditions.
(PR 80:15–81:2/70:14–20, trans. Najjar)

This passage in PR is surprising because it legitimates alterations of revealed
law (sharīʻah) based upon changing circumstances,65 which seems to cast
doubt upon the understanding of revealed law66 as conveying permanent
truths that can be added to but not supplanted. It is difﬁcult to understand
why Alfarabi would incorporate the doctrine of the superiority of living
wisdom in PR so openly after the advent of Islam if his goal was driven primarily by rhetorical or popular considerations.67 Among other reasons, although Islamic doctrine acknowledges the validity of successive prophets
before Mohammed, when prophecies were all directed to a speciﬁc time
and place, Mohammed’s prophecy is said to surpass all earlier prophecies
and his teaching is considered ﬁnal.68 Thus, it is perplexing that PR mentions
the ability of successive ﬁrst rulers to replace elements of revealed law.69

Religion (49:9–14) is more forceful: it is the obligation of a ﬁrst ruler who follows
another ﬁrst ruler “to alter much of what the [original] ﬁrst had legislated and to determine it in another way, when he knows that this is best for his time—not because the
ﬁrst one erred, but because the ﬁrst one made a determination according to what was
best for his time and this one makes a determination according to what is best subsequent to the time of the ﬁrst, this being the kind of thing the ﬁrst would alter also, were
he to observe it” (trans. Butterworth).
66
That the ﬁrst ruler, who establishes rules for a community (millah), does so based
upon knowledge obtained through revelation is stated in Religion 44:6–7 and is
implied in PR 79:3–80:3/68:28–69:24.
67
For competing views about the role of Islam in Alfarabi’s thought, see Alexander
Wain, “A Critical Study of Mabādi’ ārā’ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍ ila: The Role of Islam in the
Philosophy of Abū Naṣ r,” Journal of Islamic Philosophy 8 (2012): 45; Philippe Vallat,
“al-Fārābī’s Arguments for the Eternity of the World and the Contingency of
Natural Phenomena,” in Interpreting the Bible and Aristotle in Late Antiquity, ed. Josef
Lössl and John W. Watt (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 259.
68
This analysis is based upon Qur’an 33:40. See Brannon M. Wheeler, Prophets in the
Quran: An Introduction to the Quran and Exegesis (New York: Continuum, 2002), 332–33.
Fiqh applies and extends the Prophet’s teachings; it does not replace them.
69
PR famously never mentions prophets or prophecy, whereas VC explains in detail
how prophecy occurs.
65
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Although VC also describes successive rulers of virtuous cities (VC 250:6–
252:10/60:15–61:11), it fails to say that either they or the initial ﬁrst ruler
could alter revealed law owing to changing circumstances.
The problematic character of the quoted passage is compounded when
Alfarabi adds that, should there be a break in the succession of perfect rulers,
the law at the time of the last such ruler should be codiﬁed and written
down (PR 81:2–3/70:20–23). Since the reader was just informed that even
laws determined as a result of revelation may need to be altered with changing
circumstances, it seems that, over time, permanent written laws risk becoming
less than optimal after their codiﬁcation, despite their revealed origin. This inference is not obvious in the passage in VC stating the need to codify laws if the
succession of ﬁrst rulers is broken (VC 250:4–6/60:15–17), because this work
lacks the additional claim that ﬁrst rulers may need to alter sharīʻah with changing circumstances. Thus, VC avoids alluding to the most disturbing feature of
codiﬁed, unalterable law. PR, in contrast, offers a potentially provocative
account of written law based upon revelation, which is at odds with the
work’s own advice to avoid doctrines unsettling to citizens at large.
4. Implications for the traditional interpretations of the treatises. The preceding
contrasts make it difﬁcult to maintain that the treatises are simply summaries
of Alfarabi’s mature philosophy, since they appear to reﬂect two distinct philosophic perspectives. Some method or approach seems necessary to determine which orientation more truly represents Alfarabi’s philosophy or how
his mature philosophy somehow encompasses both.70
Scholars who instead see the treatises as primarily political or rhetorical
have endorsed some version of the view that the works are intended only
as “templates” of regimes for “future founders or lawmakers” to imitate or
legislate.71 If so, and the statements about the cosmos and mankind are rhetorical because most people can understand only images and the images are
chosen for their political utility, then why does PR contain the potentially controversial doctrines discussed above? Also, why would Alfarabi imagine that
people who can only grasp images could nonetheless accept doctrines, like
those in VC and PR, that are so obscure they have challenged students of
Alfarabi for centuries?72
If the point is rather that Alfarabi intended the treatises to inﬂuence and be
used by political leaders, not the public at large,73 the treatises’ doctrines
would presumably still be conveyed in a simpliﬁed version by founders to
nonphilosophers and nonrulers. If so, why compose two versions of the template, and which leaders should build upon which template? To understand
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See below, section IV.
Mahdi, Foundation, 6–7, 123–24, 156–57.
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See Strauss, “Quelques remarques,” 5 (the treatises’ views on metaphysics and
natural philosophy are actually the opinions of citizens of the perfect city).
73
See Mahdi, Foundation, 157.
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which template to use, the leaders would have to ﬁgure out the purpose(s)
underlying the differing templates.74 At that point, the works would cease
to be simply popular; they would compel inquiry into the signiﬁcance of portraying the universe and the place of mankind in distinct ways. The need to
choose between the templates would thus seem to trigger and give direction
to philosophic investigation.
Muhsin Mahdi refers once to the possibility that the treatises may also be
“used by students of philosophy to understand their own political-theological
predicament.”75 Although this suggestion, standing alone, might concede
that the treatises have genuine philosophic content, the sentence is followed
by Mahdi’s assertion that the treatises do not embody Alfarabi’s philosophy—
theoretical or practical.76 It is difﬁcult to understand how works that do not
embody Alfarabi’s philosophy would nonetheless be useful to students of philosophy seeking insight into their political-theological predicament, which is
itself a subject of political philosophy.
In contrast to Mahdi and Butterworth, Ulrich Rudolph argues that the
structure of the treatises resembles the structure of the literature known as
uṣ ūl al-dīn, or principles of faith.77 This might make the two treatises a
species of theology, recalling the suggestion of Butterworth and Parens that
the treatises are examples of Alfarabi’s own kalām, or theology.78 The treatises
would, then, be examples of the kalām of a philosopher wearing a theologian’s
hat rather than legislation for the members of a religious or political community. This possibility is attractive since kalām frequently employed technical arguments and complicated notions to defend more basic religious teachings.79
Contrast Butterworth, “Introductory Sections,” 38, who says that in the ﬁrst part of
VC, “without invoking any kind of religious doctrine, [Alfarabi] has shown what is
sound in the religious narrative with which we are familiar. His account has also suggested how these matters might be depicted in a manner friendly to revealed religion
yet without calling on the tenets of any particular creed.” Butterworth does not
address the issues raised by the existence of two narratives. In addition, the two
works do far more than identify aspects of conventional religion that are “sound.”
The works also seem too abstract to guide leaders to citizen-friendly religious
teachings.
75
Mahdi, Foundation, 6–7. Mahdi seems to have borrowed this expression from
Strauss. See Leo Strauss, Spinoza’s Critique of Religion, trans. E. M. Sinclair (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1997), 1.
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Mahdi, Foundation, 7.
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Ulrich Rudolph, “Reﬂections on al-Fārābī’s Mabādi’ ārā’ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍ ila,” in
In the Age of al-Farabi: Arabic Philosophy in the Fourth/Tenth Century, ed. Peter
Adamson (London-Turin: The Warburg Institute, 2008), 1, 6–13 (hereafter
“Reﬂections”).
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See Butterworth, “Introductory Sections,” 42; Parens, Metaphysics as Rhetoric, 19–20,
139–41.
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For Alfarabi’s overview of the methods of some theologians, see Enumeration
132:8–138:5.
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It raises other questions, however. For example, if the purpose of theology is to
defend “the speciﬁc opinions and actions that the founder of the religion declared and to refute by arguments whatever opposes it” (Enumeration 131:10–
12, trans. Butterworth), what religion(s) are the treatises defending and what opponents is Alfarabi trying to refute? Why are there two treatises ostensibly
devoted to the same project? Are there two different religions to defend? And
why include ideas in either book that could unsettle the virtuous citizens?
According to Rudolph, although VC is “intended to deal comprehensively
with themes and challenges taken from systematic theology,” it is not itself a
work of theology.80 Since the title of VC begins with the word “principles,”
rather than “opinions,” its content “meet[s] the standards of philosophy.”81
On the face of it, Rudolph and Mahdi-Butterworth adopt incompatible
views. Whether that incompatibility would survive scrutiny depends upon
the extent to which Alfarabi’s philosophical theology is not only occasioned
by, but itself reﬂects, the author’s mature philosophy.82

IV. Conclusion
If one assumes that the treatises reﬂect Alfarabi’s mature philosophy, why did
he compose more than one such treatise?
The titles suggest one distinction. PR was known as The Principles of the
Beings, and the work’s stated theme is the principles by which the corporeal
entities that make up the world are constituted (PR 31:2–11/29:4–5). In contrast, the theme of VC is the principles of opinions that the virtuous city’s inhabitants should hold. Both works express the view that the opinions of most
people about fundamentals are likely to reﬂect images rather than philosophic
truths. The titles thus suggest a contrast between principles explaining the
sensible world as it really is and principles of beliefs for conveying to virtuous
citizens at large, to the extent that these differ. So understood, The Principles of
the Beings might seem more philosophic in purpose or content than the counterpart treatise.
That PR is somehow more philosophic is also suggested by the fact that
only VC considers imagination a form of knowledge (VC 36:14–15)83 and it
Rudolph, “Reﬂections,” 14. Cf. Massimo Campanini, “Alfarabi and the
Foundation of Political Theology in Islam,” in Islam, the State, and Political Authority,
ed. Asma Afsaruddin (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 35.
81
Rudolph, “Reﬂections,” 3.
82
Whether or how works of philosophic theology, such as Maimonides’s Guide of the
Perplexed, represent an author’s philosophy is a question beyond the scope of this
article.
83
VC accords a higher status to imagination than does PR in other ways. The most
obvious example is that imagination is central to the former work’s discussion of
prophecy. Compare VC 240:10–246/57:13–59:9 with PR 79:3–80:4/68:28–69:25.
80
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alone describes beliefs adopted on the authority of trusted wise people as
knowledge of things “as they are” (VC 278:10–12/69:22–70:1).84 The philosophic orientation of PR prevents it from similarly elevating the status of
such opinions.85 The book’s philosophical orientation is also suggested by its
procedure, when it begins a new subject, of introducing a conceptual framework situating the subject in a larger context or classiﬁcation. The philosophical
orientation further explains why PR devotes extensive attention to abstract
topics like the nature of possible being (PR 56–62/50–54, 64–68/55–59)—subjects
that are treated summarily in VC.
The titles suggest another difference between the treatises. One work
adopts the political regime as its framing concept, whereas a framing
concept of the other is the virtuous city. “Regime” is more generic than
“city” and could include rules governing other kinds of association or even
a private individual’s way of life.86 “Regime” could thus include what
today would be called a “virtual city” in addition to one with bricks and
mortar. PR thus accommodates ordering ways of life to happiness in a
manner more generic, hence ﬂexible, than is signaled by the title of VC.87
These differences suggested by the titles are related. Among the range of
governances contemplated by PR is that of individuals attracted to a philosophic life. This is clear from that work’s sustained treatment of people’s
varying capacities to grasp and reason from intelligibles, their rank in
guiding others, and their need to be trained, educated, and instructed regardless of the level of their natural capacities.88 The emphasis on the city in VC,
with its connotation of an association of people residing within a geographical locus and sharing a common goal, helps explain the relative absence of
these subjects in that work (see VC 228:11–228:8/53:17–54:7). The interpretation advanced here is similarly helpful for understanding why the concept
of “rule” is introduced in PR in the passage about people’s cognitive development, whereas it is introduced in VC in connection with man’s bodily
functions.
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For a fuller account of this notion, see Happiness 90:3–91:12 (describing what is
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than “knowledge,” so that the reader can recognize distinctions Alfarabi makes
between the two terms.
85
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No wonder, then, that the only qualiﬁcations listed in PR for being a ﬁrst
ruler are cognitive and pedagogic achievements (PR 79:3–80:3/68:28–69:25).
In contrast, according to VC, a ﬁrst ruler must also have a “tough physique,
in order to shoulder the tasks of war” and have “limbs and organs which
are free from deﬁciency and strong… to make him ﬁt for the actions which
depend upon them” (VC 246:4–5/59:8–9, 246:9–10/59:14–15, trans. Walzer).89
Including the ﬁrst ruler’s need to conduct wars and be physically ﬁt is consistent with the thesis that VC emphasizes a veritable over a virtual city.
This interpretation also explains why VC says that to attain his preservation
and perfection, every person needs the association of many groups who cooperate to provide their respective needs, whereas the counterpart passage in PR
maintains that humans belong to the species that cannot obtain necessities nor
its most excellent states without many groups associating in one location.90
The latter formulation leaves open the possibility that not all members of
the species need political association equally. Presumably all humans need
others to obtain necessities and a level of comfort sufﬁcient to pursue their
private objectives. It is nonetheless not surprising that PR’s silence about nutrition and bodily functions and its preoccupation with the life of the mind
would lead it to abbreviate its account of these needs.
The interpretation developed here also explains the statement in PR that
the democratic city is “the most admirable and happy” of the ignorant
cities (PR 100:11/87:11, trans. Najjar),91 despite the fact that the timocratic
city, not democracy, resembles the virtuous city (PR 93:13/81:13)92 and is
the best of the ignorant cities (PR 94:1–2/81:17).93 The democratic city protects
the freedom of all the inhabitants to do what they want; and this, in turn,
makes possible the emergence of all human types, the best and the worst
(see PR 100:12–101:5/87:13–30). Democracy is thus the regime most compatible with cultivating a variety of private purposes.
The contrast between the principles of beings and the principles of citizens’
opinions also goes hand in hand with the willingness of PR to include cosmological doctrines and political precepts that could prove politically destabilizing in preference to more conventional doctrines, if that is where inquiry
89
For Alfarabi’s understanding of war in his commentary on Plato’s Laws, see Parens,
Metaphysics as Rhetoric, 69–75.
90
Compare PR 69:16–17/60:20–22 with VC 228:2–8/53:8–15. The passage in VC says
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150n13.
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Democratic City,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11 (2003): 379–94 (concluding that Alfarabi favored democracy over timocracy).
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leads. That a concrete polity with a primary focus on the collective good
would be more concerned with promoting opinions that avoid controversy
than one committed to creating an environment in which individuals are
free to question authority in the pursuit of knowledge is also consistent
with the view being developed here.
The thesis that PR develops a view of political life that privileges
the pursuit by individuals of knowledge as a way of life may also be the
reason for the stark dichotomy drawn in that book between the rule of the
ﬁrst ruler, who achieves revelation, and all other rulers (PR 80:12–81:4/70:8–
24). The cultivation of an intellectual elite would seem to presuppose thoughtful, often individualized and personal instruction by someone thoroughly
grounded in the philosophic enterprise. In contrast, the possibility of a multiplicity of types of rulers of cities of excellence, as are enumerated in VC
(250:6–252:10/60:15–61:11), may be appropriate for the needs of a political
community in which communal goods are the foremost goal. By the same
token, the viability of multiple virtuous rulerships makes the political
project of VC more feasible than that of PR. This may explain why the discussion of nonvirtuous regimes is much lengthier in PR than in VC.94
The above interpretation does not imply that all the views in PR reﬂect philosophic truths, as Alfarabi understands them, whereas the views in VC (insofar
as they differ) are merely rhetorical or for popular consumption. Nor does it
imply that PR points toward philosophic insights without regard to their political impact. It is more accurate to say that the accounts in PR emphasize considerations important for encouraging some individuals to pursue science
and philosophy in a manner not inconsistent with the goal of communal political well-being, whereas the counterpart accounts in VC take their bearings by
communal well-being in ways not inconsistent with the possibility of individual pursuits without obvious utility for the polity. Although this difference
could be cast as one of degree, in light of the numerous differences highlighted
in this essay, it is more accurate to see it as a difference in kind.
VC would thus be a philosophic book, one that outlines the human situation
if the primary goal is facilitating the well-being of polities in a concrete setting.
In that event, a prophet’s or other leader’s ability to communicate using images
comprehensible to the citizenry at large would be more critical than in PR,
where prophecy is never mentioned and the highest authority is living
wisdom subject to ongoing revision. In VC, the city is necessary for the wellbeing of every individual, and the ﬁrst ruler is presented as the means to
achieve that end. So understood, the ﬁrst ruler’s art is subordinate to the
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the material properties of human beings and nature as a whole, and the necessity of
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city’s purpose, in contrast to PR, where the ﬁrst ruler appears to be what he is
even if his followers do not constitute a concrete city. The ﬁrst ruler of PR needs
revelation, but not necessarily prophecy, which presupposes a highly developed imagination and faculty for imitation, since the ﬁrst ruler of the PR
governs individuals in the ﬁrst instance and only governs cities if he gets lucky.
The preceding reﬂections indicate the need to reopen the question of
whether, or to what extent, the two treatises convey aspects of Alfarabi’s philosophic teachings. Those who take the position that the treatises are distillations of Alfarabi’s mature philosophy should, in this author’s opinion, engage
to a greater degree with the puzzle posed by the existence of two such distillations and the seeming inner coherence of each before treating the contents of
the treatises as interchangeable or complementary. By the same token, those
who view the treatises as not reﬂecting Alfarabi’s philosophy might also
revisit their assumptions in light of some of this essay’s ﬁndings. That one
treatise suggests philosophical psychology can be understood as independent
of metaphysics, for example, would seem to derive from theoretical inquiry; it
recalls Alfarabi’s suggestion in the Attainment of Happiness that the investigator explores human rationality and celestial metaphysics independently of
one another.95 In addition, the treatises’ distinctive accounts of the types
of rulership necessary to found and govern a virtuous city may reﬂect
Alfarabi’s understanding of the relative merits of those who govern with
the wisdom of a philosopher as compared with those who rule with the
wisdom of a statesman. This interpretation would then coincide with distinctions made in the Book of Religion and Enumeration of the Sciences between the
concept of political science that is connected to theoretical philosophy and the
concept of political science that is not. These examples could be multiplied,
and they all point to the likelihood that the two treatises elaborate distinctive
notions of the discipline of political philosophy or science, the foundations
presupposed by each, and the types of political or human communities
each is peculiarly suited to foster.
The preceding analysis does not completely resolve the puzzle of why
Alfarabi wrote two treatises and why these two treatises. It contributes to
the solution by identifying some of the most signiﬁcant differences between
the treatises’ respective narratives and sketching in broad strokes the possible
philosophic and communal objectives underlying the distinctive narratives.
For the present, both the existence of the differences highlighted in this
essay and the arguable coherence of the patterns they suggest caution
against relegating the two treatises to the status of mere popular and rhetorical undertakings at the same time that they create obstacles to presuming,
without further inquiry, that the two treatises exemplify a single philosophy.
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